**AFF Answers**

**Solvency---Russia**

**Solvency---Say No---2AC**

**US action alone is insufficient – Russia requires the removal of ALL NATO commitments to eastern Europe**

**Roth ’21** [Andrew, 12-17-2021, "Russia issues list of demands it says must be met to lower tensions in Europe," Guardian, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/dec/17/russia-issues-list-demands-tensions-europe-ukraine-nato>, smarx, AZM]

Russia has put forward a **highly contentious list** of security guarantees it says it wants the west to agree to in order **to lower tensions** in Europe and defuse the crisis over Ukraine, including many elements that have **already been ruled out.**

The demands include a ban on Ukraine entering Nato and a limit to the **deployment of troops and weapons** to Nato’s eastern flank, in effect returning Nato forces to where they were stationed in **1997**, before an eastward expansion.

The eight-point draft treaty was released by Russia’s foreign ministry as its forces massed within striking distance of Ukraine’s borders. Moscow said ignoring its interests would lead to a “military response” similar to the Cuban missile crisis of 1962.

Vladimir Putin has demanded that the west provide Russia “**legal guarantees**” of its security. But the Kremlin’s aggressive proposals are likely to be rejected in western capitals as an attempt to formalise a new **Russian s**phere **o**f **i**nfluence over eastern Europe.

The demands, spelled out by Moscow in full for the first time, were handed over to the US this week. They include a demand that Nato **remove any troops or weapons** deployed to countries that entered the alliance after 1997, which would **include much of eastern Europe**, including Poland, the former Soviet countries of Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia, and the Balkan countries.

Russia has also demanded that Nato rule out **further expansion**, including the accession of Ukraine into the alliance, and that it does not hold drills without previous **agreement from Russia** in Ukraine, eastern Europe, in Caucasus countries such as Georgia or in Central Asia.

Those proposals are likely to be **viewed extremely negatively by Nato** countries, in particular Poland and the Baltic states. They have warned that Russia is attempting to re-establish a sphere of influence in the region and view the document as proof Moscow is seeking to limit their sovereignty.

A senior US official said on Friday that the Kremlin knows that some parts of its proposals were “**unacceptable**”.

**Solvency---Say No---1AR**

**Can’t solve – Putin wants complete disarmament at the border**

**Kirby ’22** [Paul; 5-9-2022; "Why has Russia invaded Ukraine and **what does Putin want**?," BBC News, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-56720589>, smarx, AZM]

Ahead of the war, he **demanded** that Nato turn the clock back to 1997 and **reverse its eastward expansion**, **removing its forces** and military infrastructure from member states that joined the alliance from 1997 and **not deploying "strike weapons near Russia's borders**". That means Central Europe, Eastern Europe and the Baltics.

In President Putin's eyes, the West promised back in 1990 that Nato would expand "**not an inch to the east**", but **did so anyway.**

**Russia’s demands can’t be met – NATO says no**

**Rosenberg ’21** [Steve; 12-17-2021; "Russia Ukraine: Moscow lists demands for defusing Ukraine tensions," BBC News, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-59696450>, smarx, AZM]

In the proposals Russia sets out a series of radical demands, which require **countries that joined Nato** after the fall of the Soviet Union not to deploy troops or weapons in areas where they **could be seen as a threat** to Russia. Heavy bombers and warships **would not be allowed** in areas outside their national airspace or waters from which they could launch an attack.

That would mean **Nato** not playing **any role at all** in any of the three Baltic republics or Poland. And Nato would have to abandon any plans for Ukraine and Georgia to eventually join the Western alliance.

**Russia asks for the impossible**

Diplomacy is the art of the possible. Well it was… until now.

It's virtually impossible to imagine the US **and Nato** signing the draft documents Russian diplomats have drawn up, without considerable changes.

Russia **demanding a veto** on who joins the Alliance. A **non-starter**. Nato has said **many times** before that Moscow can have **no say** over who gets to be a member.

**Solvency---Ukraine---Russia Cheats---2AC**

**Good faith negotiations with Russia are impossible---Putin uses peace talks as opportunities to regroup Russian forces.**

Steven **Erlanger 22**, chief diplomatic correspondent in Europe for The New York Times, a position he assumed in 2017, 3/29/2022, “Peace Talks May be Little More than Russian Tactics, Analysts say,” <https://www.nytimes.com/2022/03/29/world/europe/russia-ukraine-peace-talks.html>, RH

BRUSSELS — As envoys made progress in peace talks on Tuesday, Russia offered **concessions** that signaled a more realistic course for the war in Ukraine, while indicating it is also in **no hurry** to **end** the conflict, according to diplomats and analysts.

Russia’s deputy defense minister, Aleksandr Fomin, presented the decision to “sharply reduce” military activity around the Ukrainian capital, Kyiv, and the northern city of Chernihiv as a gesture “to increase mutual trust for future negotiations.”

“De-escalation is a euphemism for retreat,” said Lawrence Freedman, emeritus professor of War Studies at King’s College London. “Russia is adjusting its goals to reality, because war is quite empirical,” he said. “It’s not a ruse to say that they are concentrating on the Donbas, because in reality that’s all they can do.”

Some analysts say such an agreement would, at minimum, have to give Russia control of **Mariupol**, the besieged port city in Ukraine that is still somehow holding out, to create a secure land route between two areas that Russia occupies: **Crimea** to the west, and the **Donbas** to the east. And it would also, they say, have to cede control over the two administrative regions in the Donbas, Luhansk and Donetsk, which Mr. Putin has already declared to be independent republics.

Nor will Mr. Putin easily end the war, Mr. Heisbourg said. If he takes the area east of the Dnieper, “that may be enough for now, but he will rebuild his army and continue.”

For both sides, said Robin Niblett, the director of Chatham House, the London research institution, “the negotiations are **not serious**, in the sense that negotiations now for both sides are a **continuation** of the war, **not** a **solution**.” Russia can concentrate on the east, and Ukraine will find it hard to move from its agile defense to serious counterattacks, he said. “And Putin hasn’t forgotten about Kyiv.”

Even if Mr. Putin can control and “settle” for another partition of Ukraine in the east, “Ukraine has to sign up for it, and if not, I don’t think we lift the sanctions,” Mr. Niblett said.

His colleague, Mathieu Boulègue, a French scholar who studies the Russian military, agrees that **Russia** is **not** negotiating in **good faith**, but “**testing** the **waters** and applying for time, to **regroup** and **re-equip** militarily and make more gains on the ground.”

The Russian military appears to have taken control of what might be called Phase 2 of a botched operation, he said, which should have been Phase 1. Taking Mariupol, the land bridge and the Donbas “would have been the grown-up military plan.” Modern warfare is half information warfare, Mr. Boulègue said, “and success is what you make of it,” especially in a repressive media environment as in Russia now.

The Russian forces’ inability to capture cities and keep territory is apparent after a month, he said, “so strategic goals have had to change.”

But to completely withdraw from Kyiv would allow the Ukrainians to reinforce the Donbas region and give them a significant victory, suggested Michael Kofman, director of Russia Studies at CNA, a defense research institution in Virginia, [in a tweet.](https://twitter.com/KofmanMichael/status/1508795729728487427)

Traveling in Morocco, U.S. Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken also cast doubt on Russia’s pledge to reduce hostilities. “There is what Russia **says** and there’s what Russia **does**,” he said on Tuesday. “We’re focused on the latter. And what Russia is doing is the continued brutalization of Ukraine and its people and that continues as we speak.”

Russia did **not** stop fighting after the **annexation** of **Crimea** in 2014, but actively supported the separatists in the Donbas, said Ian Bond, a former British diplomat in Russia and the head of foreign policy for the Center for European Reform. “I’m a **skeptic** about the Russians giving up on the **war**,” he said. “We’ve seen this movie before in 2014 and 2015. I view this as only a pause.”

Ian Garner, a historian of Russian propaganda, [pointed out on Twitter](https://twitter.com/irgarner/status/1508823205011730442) that “Putin’s Russia — indeed, post-Soviet Russia — has been engaged in mucky, endless conflicts for years,” citing Transnistria in Moldova, Abkhazia in Georgia and the Donbas, all areas in other countries where Russian forces back separatist movements. “Not ended, maybe,” he said, but “in the **intermission**.”

Ukrainian and Western officials also suggested that Russia would be willing for a demilitarized Ukraine to join the European Union, so long as it forswore joining NATO or hosting any foreign forces.

But security **analysts questioned** the **sincerity** of such an agreement.

Mr. Bond said that the problem with Ukraine’s notion of neutrality is that so far **none** of the countries it wants to guarantee it would agree to do so. It would be like NATO membership with collective defense by another name, so highly unlikely, he said.

As for European Union membership, Mr. Niblett said, that would represent the largest danger to Mr. Putin, who helped stimulate the 2014 revolt in Ukraine when he forced the then-president, Viktor Yanukovych, to renege on a trade agreement with the bloc. If Ukraine joined now, Mr. Niblett said, the country would develop economically even faster, in contrast to Russia, “and you would end up with a South Korea next to a North Korea, and I can’t see Putin accepting that.”

Even more, he said, the European Union treaties contain a collective defense promise as well.

**Solvency---AT: Relations---2AC**

**US-Russian relations are impossible – political principles, power ambitions, and long-standing conflicts prevent an effective relationship**

**Goldgeier ’21** [James; 04/06/21; Goldgeier, professor of International Relations at American University, doctorate in political science from the University of California, Berkeley, "U.S.-Russian Relations Will Only Get Worse," Foreign Affairs, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/russia-fsu/2021-04-06/us-russian-relations-will-only-get-worse> //smarx, AZG]

It is hard to imagine that U.S.-Russian relations could get much worse, but sadly, they are unlikely to get better anytime soon. Over the past two decades, Russian President Vladimir Putin has defined his country’s interests in ways that are **incompatible with the interests** of the United States and its European allies. The latter believe that democracy, the rule of law, and the provision of security to eastern European countries enhance stability; Putin, meanwhile, considers the spread of **democracy to be a threat to his regime** and believes that having vulnerable neighbors enhances Russian security.

**Any sustained improvement** of relations between the United States and Russia beyond progress on arms control (such as the recent extension of the New START treaty) would require one of two concessions: either the United States **shelves its foundational support for democracy** and formally **recognizes a Russian-privileged sphere of influence** in the former Soviet Union or the Russian president decides his interests are not threatened by greater democracy in the region or by having fully sovereign neighbors. **Neither is likely to materialize** in the near future. The election of U.S. President Joe Biden, who has made support for democracy at home and abroad the **centerpiece of his presidency**, signals that the United States **will not cease** to champion traditional democratic values in Europe for at least the next four years. Meanwhile, as long as Putin remains in power, Moscow’s policy will continue to be marked by a fear of democracy and of the full sovereignty of Russia’s neighbors.

THE CALM BEFORE THE STORM

U.S. decision-makers approached the post–Cold War world with a clear lesson from the American experience in the twentieth century. Like many others, they drew a link between U.S. disengagement from Europe after World War I and the onset of World War II just two decades later. They also saw the United States’ decision to remain in Europe in the face of potential Soviet aggression after the end of World War II as having saved Western Europe from a communist fate. For U.S. officials, then, continued American dominance over European security through NATO was necessary to keep the peace in the uncertain times following the Cold War. The outbreak of war in Yugoslavia exacerbated those fears, feeding the narrative that without the United States, nationalism was waiting to be unleashed and conflict could erupt anywhere in the region.

But the United States also sought to reassure first the Soviets and then the Russians that the West would not take advantage of the end of Moscow’s domination of eastern Europe to undermine the former superpower’s security. When U.S. President Bill Clinton informed Russian President Boris Yeltsin in September 1994 of plans to move forward with NATO enlargement, he said, “I don’t want you to believe that I wake up every morning thinking only about how to make the Warsaw Pact countries a part of NATO—**that’s not the way I look at it.** What I do think about is how to use NATO expansion to advance the broader, higher goal of European security, unity and integration—a goal I know you share.”

That quote succinctly summarizes the differences between the United States and Russia during the Yeltsin presidency. For the United States, NATO was the right instrument to achieve European stability and security because it enabled the United States to remain in charge. The U.S. president argued as much and sought to prove that he was not trying to harm Russia by exploiting the Warsaw Pact’s collapse. But American leadership was precisely what made NATO the wrong instrument from Russia’s perspective. Yeltsin, although he might have agreed with Clinton’s objective of fostering European unity, did not share his American counterpart’s belief that NATO was the best means to achieve it—nor did any other top Russian official. Under the U.S. leadership of NATO, junior partnership would have been the best available option for Russia. But given Russian opposition to such an arrangement, it was ultimately left out of the Europe that the United States sought to build through the alliance.

Yeltsin had staked his political fortunes on bringing his country into the West. Since his domestic political battle with Mikhail Gorbachev in the waning months of the Soviet Union, Yeltsin had sought to win favor by being more pro-Western, pro-democracy, and pro-market than the Soviet leader. He was too weak to oppose American policies, so he took what he could get—not just financial assistance from the United States, its allies, and international financial institutions but also symbols that he was being treated like an equal. These included the NATO-Russia Founding Act—which established a partnership between the West and Russia as invitations to join the alliance were extended to the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland—and Russian participation in the G-7 group of advanced industrialized democracies, creating the G-8.

By the end of the 1990s, it seemed that for all the challenges in relations between the United States and Russia (most notably over NATO’s 78-day bombing campaign of Serbia on behalf of the Kosovars), the United States and Europe had managed to overcome Cold War divisions and stave off the worst of nationalism in Europe. Serb leader Slobodan Milosevic was no longer able to unleash terror in the western Balkans; the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland joined NATO and others were soon to follow; the European Union was moving forward with its own expansion across Europe; and Russia still seemed oriented toward the West. In November 1999, Clinton visited his alma mater, Georgetown University, to commemorate the tenth anniversary of the fall of the Berlin Wall. It was, in a sense, the valedictory of his effort to build on President George H. W. Bush’s vision of a Europe “whole and free.” Clinton reminded his audience that he had set out to “do for the Eastern half of Europe what we helped to do for the Western half after World War II.” As for Russia, he argued, its “transformation has just begun. It is incomplete. It is awkward. Sometimes it is not pretty, but we have a profound stake in its success.”

Clinton also declared, “Now we are at the height of our power and prosperity.” He meant it as a confirmation that the United States was capable of shaping global affairs to its liking. After all, he had made the notion of the United States as the “indispensable nation” a hallmark of his presidency. Unfortunately, the belief that the United States was at the height of its power and prosperity turned out to be a prophecy, as others, including Russia, gained more power, and the United States’ ability to dominate those countries declined dramatically.

RUSSIA’S RETURN

Reflecting on the 1990s, Putin saw humiliation for Russia. He believed that the West was working to impose its vision of world order. The collapse of the Soviet Union was “the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the century,” Putin declared. “As for the Russian people, it became a genuine tragedy. Tens of millions of our fellow citizens and countrymen found themselves beyond the fringes of Russian territory.”

Putin was not suggesting that he wanted to re-create the USSR. But rather than seek to integrate Russia into the West as his anti-Soviet predecessor had done—which inevitably meant relegating Russia to the role of junior partner to the United States—Putin sought to build an independent great power, one that could engage with the West on its own terms and dominate its immediate neighborhood. Early in Putin’s presidency, his policies were not necessarily antagonistic but sought to free Russia from Western, and especially American, interference.

From an American perspective, NATO enlargement, the 1999 Kosovo war, the 2002 unilateral American withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM Treaty), the 2003 Iraq war, and support for the 2003–5 “color revolutions” in Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, and Ukraine were discrete policies. U.S. officials saw themselves not as harming Russian interests but rather as **fostering democracy and the rule of law** across central and eastern Europe, protecting the Kosovars from Milosevic’s brutal regime, creating the ability to defend the United States and its allies from Iran’s ballistic missile threat, eliminating the possibility that Iraqi President Saddam Hussein could threaten the world with weapons of mass destruction, and supporting reformers **trying to build democracy** in fragile states.

Reflecting on the 1990s, Putin saw humiliation for Russia.

The Russian perspective starkly differed. Officials in Moscow watched the United States not only keep its Cold War alliance but expand it, incorporating territory formerly controlled by the Soviet Union, including Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. When NATO went to war against Serbia in 1999, it did so over Russian objections and without going through the UN Security Council—where Russia’s status as a permanent member would have allowed it to veto the action. A mere four years later, NATO went to war against Iraq, again without Security Council authorization and again brushing aside Russian (as well as French and German) opposition. Many in Moscow viewed the United States’ departure from the ABM Treaty as degrading Russia’s nuclear deterrent (particularly after the George W. Bush administration announced its plans to build a missile defense system with interceptors and a radar to be stationed in Poland and the Czech Republic, respectively). And for Putin, the “color revolutions” were not evidence of civil society flourishing but rather confirmation that the United States was pursuing regime change in Europe, including in Russia. For Moscow, then, the same events that, from the American perspective, were discrete policies having little to do with Russia built a narrative of a United States **seeking to impose** its will and principles on others to the detriment of Russian interests.

In 2007, Putin went to the annual Munich Security Conference and gave a speech **venting his opposition** to U.S. actions on these grounds. He complained about American unilateralism: “**One single center of power.** One single center of force. One single center of decision-making. **This is the world of one master**, one sovereign.” He argued that “the process of NATO expansion has nothing to do with modernization of the alliance,” declaring, “We have the right to ask, ‘Against whom is this expansion directed?’”

And always, there was Ukraine, which Putin told President George W. Bush in 2008 was **“not even a country.”** Yeltsin a decade earlier had warned Clinton that he could not accept Ukraine’s membership in NATO and sought a private agreement that the United States would not pursue it. By February 2008, U.S. Ambassador to Russia William Burns was telling his superiors in Washington, “Ukrainian entry into NATO is the brightest of all redlines for the Russian elite (not just Putin).” He warned that Russian officials would view offering a Membership Action Plan (MAP)—a step toward NATO membership—to Ukraine (and Georgia) at the upcoming NATO summit as “throwing down the strategic gauntlet.”

French and German opposition to offering Ukraine and Georgia MAPs took the idea off the table, but the compromise forged within the alliance led to a NATO summit declaration that Ukraine and Georgia “will become members of NATO.” By going to war with Georgia in 2008 and invading Ukraine in 2014, Putin confirmed what Burns had warned against: Putin would not tolerate the crossing of certain redlines perceived as too threatening to Russia’s interests.

Putin sought to build an independent great power, one that could engage with the West on its own terms.

The conflicts over Ukraine and Georgia reflected the United States’ and Russia’s **divergent definitions of their interests** during the George W. Bush and Putin years. As Clinton argued to Yeltsin in 1994, the United States believed expanding Western institutions would offer much-needed stability and security to eastern European countries. Meanwhile, Russia was protecting what it viewed as its privileged sphere of influence from Western norms, rules, and institutions. The West believed sovereign countries could **make their own choices** about their future, which, in turn, was viewed in Moscow as **undermining Russian interests** and, potentially, even its regime.

There appeared to be a **brief respite from these conflicts** with the “**reset,”** a policy undertaken by President Barack Obama with Russian President Dmitry Medvedev (who was keeping the presidential seat warm while Vladimir Putin held the post of prime minister). The reset was a transactional approach to policy, with each side recognizing the other’s core interests. Obama made clear he would not promote Ukrainian and Georgian membership in NATO and abandoned the missile defense plan launched by the Bush administration in favor of a different missile defense deployment more clearly designed to combat Iran. Meanwhile, Russia agreed to support stiffer sanctions on Iran to induce Tehran to abandon its pursuit of nuclear weapons. Most important, Moscow allowed the United States to create a new corridor to resupply Afghanistan through Russian-controlled airspace, which meant that the United States was no longer completely reliant on Pakistan. The two countries also agreed that it was in their mutual interest to forge a new arms control agreement, the New START treaty, which would further reduce their number of strategic nuclear weapons and provide verification measures to uphold it.

Alas, the **reset ended**. Although the Russians abstained during the Security Council’s vote authorizing NATO to launch airstrikes against Libya in 2011 to protect the population of Benghazi, Putin fumed when the operation precipitated the overthrow and death of President Muammar al-Qaddafi. Later that year, **protests erupted in Russia** around the parliamentary elections, and Putin interpreted then Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton’s statements as **egging on his opponents**. In 2013, Edward Snowden’s leaks of National Security Agency documents, followed by his receiving asylum in Russia, grabbed headlines. The **relationship truly came undone** when Putin annexed Crimea and started a civil war in eastern Ukraine the following year. Large countries invading their smaller neighbors, particularly in Europe, had been part of a bygone era and shocked Europeans who had come to believe that the creation and expansion of the European Union had definitively made war on the continent a thing of the past. In response, the United States and its allies slapped sanctions on Russia. It seemed the relationship **could not get much worse.**

DOOMED TO FAIL

Any attempt by Donald Trump to improve the relationship was **doomed from the start**. Having been compromised by Russia’s interference in the 2016 presidential election, Trump could not afford to be seen as doing Putin’s bidding, especially in a number of key areas. Congress, meanwhile, was not only unwilling to lift sanctions on Russia but added to them after the Russian interference was exposed. U.S. officials throughout the government—political appointees and career officials alike—remained committed to continuing the United States’ policy of providing reassurance to NATO’s eastern neighbors and reinforcing deterrence in the aftermath of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, including stepped-up air and sea patrols in the Baltic Sea and Black Sea regions as well as enhanced military exercises and rotations of military deployments. Beyond **exacerbating existing political polarization** in the United States, Putin achieved very little by interfering in U.S. domestic politics. Furthermore, the Trump administration’s National Defense Strategy and National Security Strategy made clear that Russia was now, along with China, a **“strategic competitor.”** And with the urging of his then National Security Adviser John Bolton, Trump pulled out of the three-decade-old Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty over the **long-standing complaint of Russian violations.**

Although his predecessor had refused to commit to extending the New START treaty, Biden agreed with the Russians on a five-year extension shortly after he entered office. Addressing the dangers of nuclear weapons is the one area in which the interests of the two sides allow for greater cooperation. Arms control emerged as a staple of the relationship in the aftermath of the 1962 Cuban missile crisis, focusing first on limiting nuclear testing and later on capping the numbers of missiles and warheads. It is the one issue that creates the optic of two superpowers, thereby giving Russia its cherished status as an equal to the United States. And it is in the interests of both sides to limit nuclear weapons and provide verification measures to prevent breaches.

A BLEAK FUTURE

In 1993, Clinton decided to back Yeltsin as the best hope for a U.S.-Russian partnership. Eight years later, George W. Bush looked Putin in the eye and came away believing he had peered into the Russian president’s soul. Obama took office in 2009 **seeking a reset** of U.S.-Russian relations with his first-term counterpart, Medvedev. Eight years later, Trump began his presidency under the cloud of Russian interference in the U.S. election but seeming to believe whatever Putin told him.

In each case, **early high hopes** for the U.S.-Russian relationship soon **gave way to bitter realities**. The 1999 NATO bombing campaign against Serbia created the worst conflict between the two powers during the Clinton-Yeltsin years. In 2008, the Russian-Georgian war left in tatters a relationship that had foundered since the 2003 U.S. decision to go to war in Iraq. Early in Obama’s second term, Putin ordered the invasion of Ukraine and the annexation of Crimea, leading the West to impose sanctions and bolster its military presence in eastern Europe. And **regardless of Trump’s strange affinity** for Putin, U.S.-Russian relations **continued to deteriorate** during his term.

As Biden begins his presidency, **one aspect of U.S.-Russian relations is over:** the high hopes for what an incoming U.S. president can achieve. The SolarWinds hack, Russian election interference, the conflict in Ukraine, and the poisoning and arrest of the Russian opposition leader Alexei Navalny are just some of the issues that will **hinder any return** to a more positive U.S.-Russian relationship. But ever since Putin first became president more than 20 years ago, the bigger issue has been the clashing ambitions that U.S. and Russian leaders have for the world and especially for Europe. Although it is possible that Trump would have bowed to Putin’s vision in a second term, Moscow’s and Washington’s conflicting visions will be on full display in the Biden years.

Better relations with another country are never an end in themselves but rather a means to **promote national interests**, and for the moment, the United States and Russia **define theirs very differently.** Beyond exploring new arms control agreements to limit strategic nuclear weapons, the bilateral agenda for U.S.-Russian relations is likely to **remain pretty thin** for the foreseeable future.

**Solvency---AT: Arms Control---2AC**

**The US has no chance at successful arms control negotiations with Russia---they want to hold onto their nukes post-Ukraine.**

Steven **Pifer 22**, former US ambassador to Ukraine and non-resident senior fellow at the Arms Control and Non-proliferation Initiative, 5/23/2022, “The Russia-Ukraine War: A Setback for Arms Control,” <https://fsi.stanford.edu/news/russia-ukraine-war-setback-arms-control>, RH

The Russia-Ukraine war is entering its fourth month, with no end in sight. The Kremlin seems intent on achieving a victory on the **battlefield**, while relations between the West and Russia **plummet** to **new lows**. One **casualty**: U.S.-Russian **arms control negotiations.**

Then, on February 24, 2022, the Russia launched its brutal and unjustified invasion of Ukraine. **Washington** wound down “business as usual” and suspended the strategic stability **dialogue**.

Resumption of those discussions almost certainly will have to wait until an end to the war, and likely for some time after that. Arms control **skeptics** will seize on Russia’s attack to **intensify** their opposition to any attempt to **negotiate** with Moscow.

If U.S.-Russian discussions resume at some point, the **delay** will have an **impact**. Persuading Moscow to negotiate limits on non-strategic nuclear weapons, which would bring in a host of complex questions, would have been difficult in any case. Now, however, the sides would have little time to conclude a treaty, let alone for the Senate to discuss ratification, before the U.S. political season cranks up in 2024.

Setting aside the time factor, the Russia-Ukraine war almost certainly will make it **harder** to **persuade** Russian **negotiators** to put non-strategic nuclear weapons on the table. The Russian military attaches **great importance** to such weapons, seeing them as one means to make up for U.S. and NATO **conventional force** advantages (to say nothing about China).

Given the abysmal performance by its military against a smaller and out-gunned foe, the Russian General Staff is likely to regard its non-strategic **nuclear arsenal** as **more necessary** than ever.

Of particular note, the Russian military has devoted significant efforts in recent years to **adding** to its **arsenal** precision-guided **conventional weapons,** including long-range strike systems such as the Kalibr cruise missile. They demonstrated some of those weapons in Syria.

This will make it **harder** to get non-strategic nuclear weapons in the negotiation. At a minimum, the price that Russian negotiators will demand, such as limits on missile defense, will increase.

The **Biden** administration thus has **no chance** to get an ambitious **agreement** in its first term. As for a second term, who knows what the American electorate will decide in November 2024?

**Arms control** offers a useful **national security** tool that can put guardrails on the adversarial aspects of the **U.S.-Russian relationship**. As Washington and Moscow find themselves at the most contentious point in their relations since the early 1980s and perhaps since the 1962 Cuban missile crisis, keeping such guardrails in place is more important than ever. Unfortunately, the **Russia-Ukraine war** will make doing that **more difficult** than ever.

**Solvency---AT: Arms Control---1AR**

**Russia and the US empirically can’t cooperate over arms control**

**Reuters ’19** [01/31/19; "US, Russia Nuclear Treaty Talks Fail," VOA, <https://www.voanews.com/a/us-russia-nuclear-treaty-talks-fail/4766558.html> //smarx, AZG]

MOSCOW/BEIJING —

Russia and the United States **failed to bridge their differences** over a landmark Cold War-era arms treaty at last-ditch talks in Beijing, Russia’s deputy foreign minister was quoted as saying by Russian news agencies Thursday.

The impasse sets the stage for the United States **to begin pulling out** of the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces treaty (INF) as early as Saturday unless Moscow moves to destroy a missile Washington says is violating the accord.

Moscow has refused to destroy the Novator 9M729 missile, **insisting it is fully compliant** with the treaty.

**“Unfortunately, there is no progress,”** Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov was quoted as saying by the RIA news agency.

“As far as we understand, the next step is coming, the next phase begins, namely the phase of the United States **stopping its obligations** under the INF, **which will evidently happen** this coming weekend,” Ryabkov was quoted as saying.

Ryabkov met U.S. Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security Andrea Thompson in Beijing on the sidelines of a meeting of the P5 nuclear powers.

Thompson confirmed to Reuters that the U.S. government will likely announce the suspension of its obligations under the INF with Russia soon.

“The Russians still aren't in acknowledgment that they are in violation of the treaty,” she said in an interview.

Thompson added, however, that “diplomacy is never done” and she anticipated more discussions.

**Solvency---AT: Treaty Violations---2NC**

**Treaty violations are reciprocal but the US has failed to attempt negotiation – caused the breakdown of European security**

**Pifer 20** [Steven, 11-19-2020, nonresident Senior Fellow - Foreign Policy, Center for Security, Strategy, and Technology, Center on the United States and Europe, Arms Control and Non-Proliferation Initiative, A retired Foreign Service officer, his more than 25 years with the State Department focused on U.S. relations with the former Soviet Union and Europe, as well as arms control and security issues. "The looming US withdrawal from the Open Skies Treaty," Brookings, <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2020/11/19/the-looming-us-withdrawal-from-the-open-skies-treaty/>] EZAY

The Trump administration’s antipathy toward arms control will strike again on November 22, when the United States withdraws from the Open Skies Treaty. That is a mistake. While Russia has violated the treaty, the **United States has reciprocated**. NATO allies support the treaty — which focuses first and foremost on enhancing European security — and wish the United States to remain a party.

Whether the treaty can continue following the American departure remains to be seen and will depend on what Russia does. When it takes office, the Biden administration should consider reentering the agreement, though that may require some creative international lawyering.

THE TREATY

The Open Skies Treaty, which entered into force in 2002, permits countries to fly unarmed aircraft with cameras and other sensors over the territory of the treaty’s other 34 members states. Based on an idea advanced by Dwight Eisenhower in the 1950s, Open Skies provides for the collection of imagery of military installations and activities in order to **foster transparency**.

Each party to the treaty has two annual quotas: the number of flights it may conduct over other treaty-parties (active quota), and the number of overflights that it must accept (passive quota). Aircraft are inspected before conducting an Open Skies flight, and personnel from the country to be overflown are on board during the flight.

The treaty offers several advantages. While the capabilities of U.S. reconnaissance satellites are superior to those of Open Skies aircraft, all 34 treaty-parties have access to imagery from the flights (whereas satellite imagery is highly classified). The treaty gives U.S. allies and partners, who lack sophisticated imagery satellites, the opportunity to gather confidence-building data. Moreover, aircraft offer **greater flexibility than satellites** in flight plans and can fly under cloud cover. Open Skies flights can also be **used to send political signals:** After Russia instigated the conflict in Donbas in 2014, for instance, the United States targeted flights at eastern Ukraine and the bordering Russian territory in order to send a message of U.S. support for Kyiv.

By 2019, the 34 parties had conducted a total of **more than 1,500 overflights**. During the treaty’s first 15 years of operation, the United States conducted 196 flights over Russia and Belarus (the two are paired for treaty purposes), while Russia conducted 71 flights over the United States.

Unfortunately, Russia has violated the treaty by imposing restrictions on certain flights over its territory. In response, the United States imposed reciprocal restrictions on Russian flights over U.S. territory. While the Russian violations are problematic, Washington has not declared that they constitute a material breach — that is, a violation that vitiates the central purpose of the treaty. Nevertheless, on May 21, Secretary of State Pompeo released a statement saying that, unless Moscow returned to full compliance, Washington would leave the treaty in six months’ time. The U.S. government provided formal notification of its intention to withdraw to the other treaty parties the following day; hence, the U.S. withdrawal will take effect on November 22.

A SERIAL KILLER OF ARMS CONTROL?

By all appearances, the Trump administration sees little value in arms control and nonproliferation arrangements. In 2018, President Trump decided to withdraw from the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action that limited Iran’s nuclear capabilities. Iran can produce the fissile material for a nuclear bomb in a much shorter time today than three years ago. Meanwhile, the United States stands isolated, with close allies such as Britain, France, and Germany staying in the agreement and ignoring Washington’s requests to apply sanctions on Tehran.

In 2019, the Trump administration withdrew from the 1987 Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces Treaty, an agreement signed by Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev that banned an entire class of missiles. Russia had violated the agreement by deploying **a** prohibited missile, but President Trump’s team showed **no interest in preserving the treaty**, eschewing military and political measures that could have pressured Moscow to return to compliance.

In 2020, administration officials reportedly considered conducting an underground nuclear test. That would violate a long-standing test moratorium observed by the United States, Russia, China, Britain, and France (the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, which would prohibit all nuclear tests, has not entered into force). A U.S. nuclear test would open the door to tests by others, eroding the nuclear knowledge advantage the United States enjoys from having conducted more tests than the rest of the world combined.

Happily, the 2010 New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) appears safe. True, the Trump administration could in its final days give notice of an intention to withdraw, but the intention could only be carried out three months later. President-elect Biden supports New START and supports its extension; he would revoke any such notice.

However, Open Skies looks to be the outgoing Trump administration’s next — and last — victim.

WHAT NEXT FOR OPEN SKIES?

The Open Skies Treaty focused on strengthening confidence and security in Europe, one reason why the Trump administration should have given the views of its allies greater weight. A major question now turns on what Moscow will do, given that the U.S. departure will mean that Russia can conduct flights over European territory and Canada but not the United States.

If Moscow decides to withdraw from Open Skies, perhaps citing the treaty’s decreased value because it can no longer overfly American territory, the treaty will collapse. NATO allies will see little point in overflying other allies or partners such as Sweden and Finland. Alternatively, Moscow could decide to remain in the treaty, at least for a time, in part to score propaganda points over the U.S. withdrawal.

**Solvency---AT: Terror---2AC**

**US-Russia cooperation can’t solve terrorism in the Middle East – differing tactics and barriers make them incompatible**

**Clarke ’18** [Colin P.; 02/09/2018; Ph.D in international security policy from the University of Pittsburgh, non-resident Senior Fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute, lecturer at Carnegie Mellon University, associate fellow at the International Centre for Counter-Terrorism, political scientist at the RAND corporation, "Russia Is Not a Viable Counterterrorism Partner for the United States," TheRANDBlog, <https://www.rand.org/blog/2018/02/russia-is-not-a-viable-counterterrorism-partner-for.html> //smarx, AZG)

Foolish as it would be to argue that U.S. and Russian interests never align, the United States in its broader battle with terrorism **cannot cooperate meaningfully with Moscow**. On a practical level, there are **difficulties in sharing intelligence** even with trusted allies, much less in a relationship rife with mistrust, as U.S.-Russia ties now are. More importantly, the argument that Moscow and Washington are fighting a common enemy because both face threats from militant Islamists is **misleading**: A close look at the battles each is waging reveals that Russia and the U.S. are fighting either different groups or the same groups but for **different reasons** and using **very different approaches**. Today Russia is America's adversary and its actions, particularly attempts to fracture NATO, do not align with larger U.S. security goals. Calling Moscow a “partner” in the counterterror fight would hand it a huge PR victory—note that the Putin-Trump call was made public by the Kremlin—and a giant fig leaf to cover up its efforts to undermine the U.S. on the global stage.

Obstacles to Cooperation

Sharing intelligence with foreign countries is easier said than done. Practical difficulties include concerns about **revealing sources and methods**, as well as **strict regulations** involving access to information with **varying levels of classification**. Clearing these hurdles is even more difficult in a political climate where U.S.-Russian **military-to-military contacts are all but frozen** and the U.S. intelligence community believes (PDF) Russia to have waged “an influence campaign in 2016 aimed at the U.S. presidential election,” with several official investigations underway.

Syria ostensibly would be the place to start on counterterrorism cooperation, but Russia has proven to be an **unreliable partner** on matters less sensitive than intelligence sharing. Earlier this year, the U.S.-led coalition said Russian military officials had rejected a coalition request for permission to strike Islamic State targets near a strategically important garrison at al-Tanf, which is used by U.S. troops. The Pentagon has **repeatedly complained** of **dangerous maneuvers** by Russian fighter jets, most recently in December. And U.N. investigators say there is strong evidence suggesting that the Russian-brokered 2013 deal to rid Syria of its chemical weapons did not work, while Moscow has blocked related investigations from continuing. There are also reports that “the Kremlin's diplomatic coordination with the United States is much less intense” under the Trump administration than under Barack Obama's.

It also **remains unclear** exactly what Russia could provide to the United States of value in terms of intelligence or military capabilities. The U.S. is **doing a better job** battling Islamic State than Russia is. In areas where Russian-backed forces operate, IS fighters **regularly manage to move freely**, especially around the middle Euphrates River valley, according to U.S. officials. Moreover, despite Putin's declaration of “victory” in December, Russia's main military facilities in Syria were **attacked** in January—first with mortars killing two servicemen and then with a dozen armed drones, possibly from territory covered by a Moscow-brokered cease-fire—**demonstrating the Russian forces' vulnerability**. Overall, despite Moscow's growing influence in the Middle East, the region is still not one where Russia has more **knowledge or sway** than Washington.

The 'Common Enemy' Fallacy

The primary reason U.S.-Russian counterterrorism cooperation is even under discussion is because of the idea that the two countries are fighting a common enemy—jihadist groups in general, and Islamic State in particular. In reality, Moscow's and Washington's respective wars on terror **differ significantly** in motives, aims, targets, tactics and strategies, and even who the enemy is, which further dims any prospects for cooperation.

In Syria, for example, the U.S. wants to defeat the Islamic State because it is an **engine of international terrorism**, while Russia fights the group mainly because it is an enemy of President Bashar al-Assad—whose regime Moscow has saved from collapse. Meanwhile, Russian special forces and warplanes serve as a **force multiplier** for Hezbollah, a recognized terror group. Differences like these explain in large part why U.S.-Russian cooperation in Syria has been **limited to “deconfliction” and avoiding accidents**, while the two sides' definitions of the terrorist threat continue to diverge.

Another key difference in the two countries' threat perceptions is that Moscow has long had to fight Islamist terrorism **in its backyard**, while the U.S. has been doing battle in **distant lands**. In the mid- to late-1990s, myriad anti-Russian rebel groups, primarily from the traditionally Muslim North Caucasus region, adopted religious ideologies instead of secular separatist aspirations—a shift attributed by many scholars to the growing influence of foreign fighters from the Middle East and Central Asia. Since then, Islamic militants have launched many high-profile attacks on Russian soil far beyond the battlefields of the Caucasus. These have included targeted destruction of transportation infrastructure and meticulously planned operations specifically designed to kill civilians and spread terror throughout the population, such as the Moscow theater hostage crisis in 2002 and the Beslan school siege in 2004. The U.S. has suffered far fewer attacks by jihadists on its home turf and has been fighting largely to keep them away from its shores and to help protect allies in Europe. This difference, too, **calls for different approaches to counterterrorism**: Expeditionary counterterrorism requires a **significant deployment of military force**, while domestic counterterrorism can rely more on **local and federal police** and an array of intelligence agencies.

The U.S. and Russia also **differ markedly** in their approaches to fighting terrorism and it is **hard to imagine** how these could be made **compatible.** Roughly put, the U.S. aims to espouse a comprehensive approach that **tries to win hearts** and minds by finding out about communities' grievances and factoring in socioeconomic development; Russia does not explicitly try to do this, relying instead on **heavy-handed methods**, many of which the U.S. military could not easily get away with and in fact condemns.

These have included **indiscriminate bombing**; forced disappearances whose victims got no legal representation, were held incommunicado and were sometimes never heard from again; and collective punishment, including the targeting of suspected insurgents' families, friends and neighbors. Russia's focus has been **largely kinetic**, as the military has **relied on a decapitation strategy** to eliminate successive high-ranking insurgent military commanders over the years. This approach has been quite effective in the short term, but also may be myopic, trading (PDF) longer-term stability for short-lived security: Insurgents' social, political and economic grievances have largely been ignored, practically ensuring that future generations of militants will pick up the mantle of jihad. In Chechnya, for example, anti-Moscow militants have been all but wiped out under a ruthless, Moscow-backed strongman, but the insurgency has shifted to neighboring Dagestan. Indeed, thousands (PDF) of Russian fighters have **gone to wage jihad** in Syria and Iraq and experts are just beginning to assess the threats they will pose in years to come.

In an ideal world Russia and the U.S. would be able to cooperate against jihadist organizations, jointly developing counterterrorist best practices, but for all the reasons listed above **this is not realistic** at present.

**Revisionism**

**Yes Revisionism---2AC**

**Putin’s policy reflects revisionist goals.**

**Grigoryan, 22** (Armen Grigoryan, co-founder and vice president of the Yerevan-based Centre for Policy Studies, 5/23/22, New Eastern Europe - A bimonthly news magazine dedicated to Central and Eastern European affairs, "The war in Ukraine and historical revisionism," <https://neweasterneurope.eu/2022/05/23/the-war-in-ukraine-and-historical-revisionism/> /alundy)

On April 16th, Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a law imposing fines of up to 15 days in jail for equating the USSR and Nazi Germany’s goals and actions during the Second World War. This law also covers denial of the USSR’s “humanitarian mission during the liberation of European countries”. This is the logical extension of a law adopted in July, which prohibited these aforementioned actions but did not mention punitive measures. Before this, in 2014, public statements containing “false information” about the USSR’s wartime actions or Soviet veterans were criminalised. An amendment to the country’s criminal code imposed large fines or up to five years imprisonment.

Such legal amendments are yet another phase in the ongoing consecration of Soviet victory in the “Great Patriotic War”. The victory is now the principal element in Russia’s memory politics, with corresponding ideology used to legitimise **militarism** and **great power ambitions**. These recent developments are not just another step towards the country’s revival of Soviet propaganda narratives. They are also intertwined with the Russian aggression in Ukraine and some of the most tragic events of the ongoing war. These changes once again demonstrate what can happen when governments attempt to deny historical crimes through the use of ideology.

At the same time, this is not very surprising. This became especially clear to me after receiving a Visegrad Scholarship to study some of the roots of current Russian policy at the Central European University and Open Society Archives (OSA) in Budapest.

The OSA collection comprises communist propaganda materials from the Stalin era to the 1980s, the findings of Ray J. Madden’s US Congress committee on the Katyń massacre, Polish samizdat and émigré press, a number of western publications, Soviet publications from the late 1980s, and other materials. Overall, ƒ. Moscow originally denied responsibility for the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact and its consequences, such as the partition of Poland, the annexation of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, and the Katyń massacre. The state would only formally admit its guilt in the Gorbachev era.

A new national myth

However, a revival of some Soviet narratives began a few years later under the pretext of fighting against the “falsification of history”. In May 2009, Moscow established the Presidential Commission of the Russian Federation to Counter Attempts to Falsify History to the Detriment of Russia’s Interests. The then head of the president’s staff, Sergei Naryshkin, was appointed chairman of the commission. Since 2016, Naryshkin has been the director of the Foreign Intelligence Service. He recently made international headlines following an infamous session of Russia’s Security Council on February 21st. During this meeting, he proposed the recognition of the so-called “Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics” and was ridiculed by Putin.

Soon after the commission’s creation, historian Boris Sokolov predicted rather accurately that its activities would result in efforts to suppress information about the Soviet occupation and annexation of the Baltic states, as well as other crimes committed by the Soviet regime. He also highlighted the existence of an official Soviet foreign ministry memorandum published in 1948. This document was released in response to the publication of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact’s secret protocols in the US and was titled “Falsifiers of History”. The memorandum, which would provide the basis for Soviet propaganda over the next few decades, denied the existence of the secret protocols and stated that Moscow’s pre-war attempts to form a collective security framework had been undermined by Great Britain and France. As a result, the USSR was compelled to accept the pact in order to win more time to better prepare for an unavoidable war with Germany.

It has also been noted that a gradual return to a **Stalinist interpretation of history** began, at least in education, right at the start of Putin’s rule. History textbooks published in Russia in the 1990s admitted that the USSR’s territorial gains in 1939-40 happened against the will of the peoples of the Baltic states and Eastern Poland (most of the authors avoided the term “annexation”, likely because it would imply similarities between Stalin and Hitler’s interests and methods). By 2003, however, any mention of the secret protocols was removed from new textbooks. Since 2007, the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact has been explained in favourable terms, while Stalin has become revered as an “effective manager”.

Soon after the formation of the “falsification of history” commission, the head of the Russian Defence Ministry’s Institute of Military History, Sergei Kovalev, published an article on the ministry’s website. This asserted that Poland had been responsible for beginning the Second World War, as it had declined “justified” German demands. Meanwhile, the USSR needed a non-aggression pact with Germany and had deployed troops in the Baltic states in order to improve border security. The article was deleted from the website the next day and it was explained that it just represented Kovalev’s personal opinion. However, arguments in favour of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact and assertions about Poland’s responsibility for the beginning of the war would be repeated later – at a much higher level.

One significant example of the outcomes produced by the commission is a book published in 2011 by State Duma member Vladimir Medinsky, who would later continue developing the state’s new ideology as minister of culture. In The War: The Myths of the USSR, 1939-1945, Medinsky justified the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact using familiar Soviet arguments. He denied that the USSR was responsible for the Katyń massacre, and so forth. Medinsky implied that the European Union was to blame for statements that Stalin had been responsible for the beginning of war, along with Hitler. A rather characteristic favourable review of Medinsky’s book stated that “Almost everything that liberal journalists write about nowadays was invented long ago by Dr. Goebbels.”

Perhaps most significantly, the change of rhetoric could be observed in Putin’s statements. While during a visit to Poland in 2009 he had denounced the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact as “collusion to solve one’s problems at others’ expense”, in 2015 he defended it at a joint press conference with German Chancellor Angela Merkel, all the while blaming western nations. This falls in line with the old Soviet argument about Great Britain and France’s unwillingness to support a collective security framework. Later on, Putin increasingly appeared obsessed with keeping the Soviet version of history intact. At a Commonwealth of Independent States summit in December 2019, he lectured his counterparts on the causes and events of the Second World War. He made numerous allusions to Soviet propaganda, including speculation on the “Munich Betrayal” in an attempt to exonerate the USSR and put the blame on Great Britain, France and Poland. The extent of Putin’s argument led to a reply from Warsaw’s foreign ministry, which highlighted the Soviet Union’s invasion, occupation, deportations and mass killings. This document also proposed relaunching the Polish-Russian Group for Difficult Issues that had operated in the 1990s. Another statement on the issue was later made by Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki.

In June 2020, Putin expanded on his historical argument in a lengthy article in The National Interest. Among other issues, the piece implied that the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact and the USSR’s actions had been justified, as the “Munich Betrayal” had meant that the West would deal with security issues without taking Soviet interests into account. He also claimed that the USSR entered the war only when it had been attacked by Germany and praised the Red Army’s “liberation mission in Europe”. The Russian leader also defended the post-war division of Europe by referring, even though indirectly, to the Yalta Conference agreements. Most absurdly, the Russian embassy in Berlin [sent](https://www.rferl.org/a/russia-baffles-german-historians-with-request-they-supplement-lectures-with-an-article-by-putin/30690752.html) a translation of the **revisionist article** to a number of German professors, asking them to make use of the work in their lectures.

**Yes Revisionism---1AR**

**Putin’s propaganda is grounded in revisionist tendencies, revising the past.**

**Mendel, 22** (Iuliia Mendel journalist, ex-press-secretary to the President of Ukraine, and communication consultant, 2-20-22, Putin – the Crude Revisionist who Ignores Lessons of History," KyivPost, <https://www.kyivpost.com/article/opinion/op-ed/putin-the-crude-revisionist-who-ignores-lessons-of-history.html> /alundy)

Vladimir Putin wants not only to seize new territories, but to own history. History often falls victim to autocracies and dictatorships. Reshaped historical narratives become compelling explanations of all-powerful leaders and serve their **propaganda** as one of the instruments to preserve and increase their political weight.

No wonder that Russian President Vladimir Putin comes up with absurdly manipulated historical facts to push his geopolitical policies. But it is more than just lies or manipulation. It is a well-grounded philosophy that not only **revises the past**, but also becomes his instrument to reshape the present.

Isn’t that what Putin does when he plays the “independent republics” card, with which the post-Soviet space that emerged 30 years ago is generously dotted by his bloody will: South Ossetia in Georgia, Moscow-created Luhansk and Donetsk people’s republics in Ukraine and the breakaway Transnistria republic in Moldova – God knows how many more such black holes the Kremlin leadership can create with the help of mercenaries and propaganda.

Putin is **offended** by the collapse of the Soviet Union. His love for that bygone era is actively cultivated in Russia even 30 years after its implosion. Putin manipulates the notion of democracy by comparing artificially created pseudo-states with the real ones that constituted the USSR. He may indeed not see the difference between Ukraine, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Georgia and the conjured formations of LPR, DPR, South Ossetia, Abkhazia, or Transnistria. In this way, Putin suspends the understanding of freedom as a hostage to his biggest political intrigue – the confrontation between the West and Russia.

According to this primitive formula, if the U.S. once divided the USSR into some 15 republics, why can’t Russia today break those republics into smaller ones?

Having amassed nearly 200,000 troops with weapons and military equipment around Ukraine’s southeastern borders, Putin refuses to directly talk with the political leadership in Kyiv. Literally, he ignores any attempt at dialogue and sends messages through European interlocutors. This seems to be his response to the Ukrainian leadership’s unwillingness to negotiate with the Russian installed puppets whose Moscow-armed formations have been fighting in Ukraine’s two easternmost regions of Luhansk and Donets for nearly eight years.

The parallels are blustering, but quite possible for a man offended by the historical collapse of the state he seems to consider his homeland, the USSR, and who is already personally expressing doubts about Ukraine’s sovereignty. “I am convinced that Ukraine’s true sovereignty is possible precisely in partnership with Russia,” Putin wrote in a diatribe in July 2021.

Putin acts as if he really sees no difference between the sovereign state of Ukraine and the quasi-republics that are under his own military control. It is as if the Russian leader is trying to teach the world a lesson by creating imitations and empty simulacra on copies of real historical facts.

Putin’s version of history distorts understandable values to help manage his own country. If you don’t know how to create, then ”protect” and take away. Russia’s hybrid or covert invasions of Ukraine’s Crimean Peninsula and Georgia’s Abkhazia, and Moldova’s Transnistria province under the guise of “protection” was done against phantom enemies he conjured.

Isn’t this what happened to the Soviet Union? While the West was recovering from World War II, building democracy and competitive market economies, the USSR was building tanks to defend itself and intimidating its own people with U.S. aggression. A Ukrainian diplomat who survived Stalin’s death as a child recounted how his entire family stayed awake, gazing up into the night sky. “We waited that every second we could see American missiles that were going to destroy us,” he recalled vividly for the rest of his life.

The Soviet Union, in fact, was built on falsehoods, **lies**, and **unrealistic, artificial ideals**. Putin is deliberately repeating this failed scheme and therefore risks his empire falling just as loudly.

**Russia is revisionist --- it is transparent in its intentions to regain power and overthrow the international hierarchy**

**Pisciotta, 20** (Barbara Pisciotta, 8-9-2019, Associate professor Roma Tre University, Russian revisionism in the Putin era: an overview of post-communist military interventions in Georgia, Ukraine, and Syria, <https://www-cambridge-org.proxy.lib.umich.edu/core/services/aop-cambridge-core/content/view/A243776484894C350A663D1AE7DF6621/S0048840219000182a.pdf/russian-revisionism-in-the-putin-era-an-overview-of-post-communist-military-interventions-in-georgia-ukraine-and-syria.pdf> /alundy)

On the assumptions that changing the status quo is the basic aim of a revisionist strategy (Buzan, 2008) and that acceptance of the risks involved in the use of force is a key factor in distinguishing the different forms of revisionism (Schweller, 2015), this study puts forward a new typology of revisionism. The six types identified are based on three dimensions: the means employed (peaceful/violent), the nature of the objectives (territory/norms/power), and the level of action (regional/global). The introduction of a new typology of revisionism can also stimulate further research on the possible change of goals, means, and level of action of the potential claims of the revisionist powers that have economic and military capabilities to act both regionally and globally to change the status quo (see the case of Russia, China and, according to some scholars, the United States). Further research insights can be derived from the application of normative revisionism to the various empirical cases (see the Arab countries and the developing). Our empirical analysis, in particular, confirms the importance of the level of action as a new element with respect to previous typologies and makes it possible not only to demonstrate the central part played by the military option in Russian strategy inside and outside the post-Soviet space but also and above all to confirm the escalation of the revisionist objectives pursued both at the regional level with the interventions in Georgia and Ukraine, and at the global level with the intervention in Syria. The respectively nationalist (Georgia and Ukraine) and radical (Syria) nature of the interventions emerges in relation both to the means and the level of action of these interventions, and to the objectives. In Georgia and Ukraine, Russia obtained the control and/or annexation of territories like South Ossetia, Abkhazia, and Crimea, strengthened its position with respect to neighbouring countries, and impeded the expansion of NATO and the EU. In Syria it obtained control of the port of Tartus, ended the American monopoly in the war on terrorism by asserting itself as a strong party to the peace negotiations, challenged American interests in the Middle East by strengthening the Assad regime, and clearly manifested its determination to halt the decline that set in after 1989. The dual nature of Russia’s objectives – both territorial (annexation and/or control over certain areas) and political (improvement of power and prestige at the regional and global levels) – characterized the country’s **revisionist strategy** as a whole from August 2008 to March 2016, confirming the importance of the gradual increase in military expenditure and the reforms of the SAP in pursuit of the same. If the spectre of the ‘end of history’ that hovered over the ashes of communism was swept away by Putin at the end of the 1990s and the impact that his long period in power has had on domestic and regional balances is **unquestionable**, what is instead still in need of discussion is the effect that his plan of radical revisionism has had on the configuration of the international system as a 102 Barbara Pisciotta Published online by Cambridge University Press whole. As matters now stand, any talk of American decline at the military level is misleading and empirically incorrect. It is, however, necessary to take the readiness to use military force as our starting point if we are to understand the nature and the consequences of Russian revisionism at the global level. A power in a position of hegemony cannot in fact hesitate to use all of the diplomatic, economic, and military means at its disposal in order to preserve its status and prevent any destabilizing threats from calling it into question. The USA has made systematic use of force since 1989 to preserve its spheres of influence all over the world and eliminate threats (from figures like Milosevic, Saddam Hussein, and Qaddafi) to the stability of the liberal world order on which its indisputable supremacy rested. Where it intervened militarily, with or without a resolution of the UN Security Council, it told the rest of the world that it was the only actor authorized – or rather self-authorized – to intervene in defence, at least formally, of human rights at the expense of national sovereignty. Russia’s revisionism is the child of this strategy. In order to alter the status quo in its favour, Putin has operated on at both the regional and the global levels to oppose American expansion in the post-Soviet space and its version of humanitarian intervention all over the world, not hesitating to use force in order to challenge the United States openly and bend the international rules to Russia’s advantage. At the regional level, Georgia and Ukraine have been blocked. Their entry into the EU and NATO will not be possible without Russian consent or the risk of a frontal clash with Moscow. At the global level, the effects of Russia’s strategy will have to be assessed in the medium and long terms. Russia has now revealed its intentions and explicitly threatened the US monopoly in Syria both in words and in deeds. It is clearly not enough for Russia to **alter the hierarchy of power**. It wants to obtain acknowledgement of its **prestige** as a great power in both diplomatic and military terms. In other words, Russia wants to play a decision-making part once again in the management of world affairs. It also wants a less centralized system offering the opportunity to regain important margins of power.

**Yes Revisionism---Hybrid War---1AR**

**Revisionism is uniquely proven in hybrid warfare.**

**Sargeant, 21** (Madison Sargeant, research assistant at Project on the Political Economy of Security, 2/3/2021, Small Wars Journal, “Russia’s Hybrid War in Ukraine: Historical Revisionism and ‘Twiplomacy’”, <https://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/russias-hybrid-war-ukraine-historical-revisionism-and-twiplomacy> /alundy)

The rise of digital diplomacy has provided state actors new venues to promote their national interests. Twitter specifically has emerged as a “megaphone and substantive communications medium”[1] for heads of state, governmental institutions, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and scholars. The Russian Federation has exploited the growing importance of social media platforms to diplomacy in order to seek legitimization and normalization of its 2014 annexation of Crimea, which is recognized almost universally as Ukrainian territory.[2] Despite a robust digital campaign, the percentage of Ukrainians that believe Crimea is Russian territory has actually decreased since 2014. Furthermore, Russia’s social media activity has not strengthened its claim to Crimea, but it does provide insight into how the state uses emerging technologies below the threshold of war to meet strategic objectives.

Background

When the Soviet Union collapsed, Ukraine found itself in possession of the third largest nuclear arsenal in the world. Encouraged by both the United States and Russia, Ukraine forewent the arsenal for international security guarantees protecting its independence and territorial sovereignty, as outlined in the 1994 Budapest Memorandum.[3] In 2014, Russia breached these security guarantees by invading and annexing the Crimean Peninsula after the ousting of Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych during the Revolution of Dignity (known internationally as the Euromaidan Revolution). The annexation was swiftly condemned,[4] with world leaders pointing to international law as the foundation of their argument against a perceived act of aggression. Russian President Vladimir Putin responded that the security guarantees made in the early 1990s were only valid with the pre-revolution Ukrainian government, insinuating that the post-Euromaidan government was leading a “new”[5] state, and that the Russian military had an obligation to protect ethnic Russians from the “nationalist junta”[6] in Kyiv. With most of the international community rejecting these justifications, Russia launched a **revisionist information campaign** to legitimize occupation of the peninsula.

Increased use of social media has led to a **proliferation** of **historical revisionism** and reframing of current events, though the Kremlin is not a rookie when it comes to contorting the narrative around its behavior. For example, Moscow has long attempted to erase the Red Army’s mass murder of nearly 22,000 Polish soldiers in 1943 in Katyn, Russia by focusing conversations on the destruction of the Belorussian village, Khatyn, by occupying Nazi forces.[7] It wasn’t until 1990 that the Soviets admitted the Red Army was “responsible for the murders,”[8] despite Kremlin-sponsored social media accounts, such as the Russian Mission to the EU account (@RusMission\_EU) denying this fact as recently as May 2020.[9] Russia utilizes internet trolls,[10] bots,[11] and state-affiliated social media accounts to shape narratives by targeting naïve social media users who either inadvertently perpetuate falsehoods or rely on an extreme form of confirmation bias[12] in which they only receive and re-share content they agree with.

Russia’s Digital Activity

In recent years, Russia has honed its social media tactics alongside a contingency of its other information warfare practices. Russia’s **information warfare** against Ukraine was described in 2014 by U.S. Air Force General Philip Breedlove as the “most amazing information warfare blitzkrieg.”[13] Social media plays a significant role in the Russian information warfare strategy as it provides “cheap, efficient, and highly effective access”[14] to audiences while maintaining plausible deniability for the Kremlin. The conditions of the social media environment—sense of anonymity, reach, and speed—provide unique challenges to combating information campaigns on such platforms. Social media platforms allow trolls and bots to congregate with real individuals that can be separated into three categories: (1) “useful idiots,” who unknowingly give credibility to Russian propaganda and objectives; (2) “fellow travelers,” who are Russian and Kremlin sympathizers, and; (3) “agent provocateurs,” who are actively being manipulated by the Russian government.[15] Collectively, these individuals and accounts provide ample ground for the Kremlin to engage in narrative-shaping and other disinformation campaigns.

Twitter and other social media present opportunities to the Russian government to export its historical and **political narratives** to both foreign governments and private citizens in every corner of the world. Those not privy to Ukrainian-Russian relations, international law, or the underlying forces of the 2014 Revolution of Dignity may be more susceptible to Russian propaganda that “Crimea is Russia” and that Russia invaded to “protect Crimea” from the “nationalist junta” that is the post-Euromaidan government.[16] These individuals may promote these views, providing attention to Russia’s stance, further legitimizing and normalizing it. Furthermore, such attention confirms the biases of pro-Russia activists who seek validation of their views online.[17] Political pundits may also accidentally or purposefully contribute to this bias. A November 2019 clip[18] of American political commentator Tucker Carlson asking, “Why shouldn’t I root for Russia? And I am,” regarding the ongoing war in eastern Ukraine went viral and was largely met with condemnation from a variety of Twitter users. Carlson in this instance was a “useful idiot,”[19] and the confidence his comment might provide to pro-Russia activists, while difficult to quantify, should be considered.

**Russia has only become more bold --- especially in hybrid warfare**

**Reznikov, 20** (Oleksii Reznikov, Deputy Prime Minister of Ukraine for Reintegration of the Temporarily Occupied Territories. 7-8-2020, "Containing the Kremlin: Why the West must rethink policy towards a revisionist Russia," Atlantic Council, <https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/containing-the-kremlin-why-the-west-must-rethink-policy-towards-a-revisionist-russia/> /alundy)

Nor is Russia likely to stop there. Spreading instability is a central tenet of Vladimir Putin’s **hybrid warfare doctrine**, and there is every reason to believe this includes creating greater turbulence in Europe. The Russian president has recently called the borders of all the former Soviet republics into question, [claiming](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GcNEb9VZvzw&feature=youtu.be) that numerous unspecified republics left the USSR while in possession of “historically Russian lands.” This thinly veiled threat is not limited to Ukraine, Belarus, or Kazakhstan. It also applies to the three Baltic nations, which are all EU and NATO member states.

Putin underlined his ominously imperial thinking towards the Baltic states in a June 2020 [article](https://nationalinterest.org/feature/vladimir-putin-real-lessons-75th-anniversary-world-war-ii-162982) for The National Interest that allowed the Russian ruler to share his profoundly unapologetic view of Soviet conduct during WWII. He described the 1940 invasion and annexation of the Baltic states as “the incorporation of Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia,” before going on go claim, “their accession to the USSR was implemented on a contractual basis, with the consent of the elected authorities.” Comments of this nature expose the grim reality of **Putin’s revisionist worldview**, regardless of the wishful thinking that many of Ukraine’s partners would prefer to believe.

This raises a number of important questions. To what degree is the West aware of the challenge it faces? Does the West recognize that spreading turbulence closer to the heart of Europe is part and parcel of Russia’s strategy? Should Europe help to create a fault line that runs from the Baltic States to the Black Sea? This is no metaphor, nor is it an exaggeration.

The experience of recent years should already have been sufficient to convince Western leaders that appeasement is not an effective way to address the security challenges presented by Putin’s Russia. Failure to confront the Kremlin in Crimea in early 2014 has only encouraged greater **Russian boldness**. Moscow has expanded its military presence everywhere from Syria to Libya, while at the same time broadening the scope of its hybrid war operations throughout North America, the European Union and beyond.

With examples of Russian aggression increasing in the international arena, the Western world must decide where to draw the line. Ukraine faces no such dilemmas – the country is committed to defending every inch of its territory, even if that means doing so alone. Western leaders can either commit to helping Ukraine defend itself, or face the consequences on their own territory in the near future.

At present, the Western world seems unsure of how best to contain a resurgent and revisionist Russia. As the front line nation in the current confrontation, Ukraine is the most obvious focus for containment strategies. In practical terms, this means revisiting the Minsk Process and adapting the framework of the current dialogue to reflect geopolitical realities. Now is not the time to cling dogmatically to existing arrangements. On the contrary, creative approaches are required in order to safeguard global security and prevent further European destabilization.

As well as supporting a pragmatic approach to implementation of the Minsk Agreements, Western leaders should also revisit the role and functions of the international security institutions involved in the Ukraine peace process. For example, the OSCE has never deployed peacekeepers on a large scale to neutralize a conflict. The time may now be ripe for such a move. We are fully aware of the gravity of the challenge, but a successful outcome would be significant for the entire continent. This would require real leadership and could be a special task for Sweden, which will chair the OSCE in 2021.

If the usual coalitions do not work, we in Ukraine should think about creating new ones and attracting new allies.

The search for new models across various international platforms should be coupled with expanded bilateral cooperation between Ukraine and all countries invested in restoring peace in Europe and preserving it for the wider world. Ukraine has recently progressed to the next stage in its relations with NATO. We are ready to affirm Ukraine’s new Enhanced Opportunity Partner [status](https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/nato-upgrades-ukraine/) in collective as well as bilateral security models. This could mean recognizing Ukraine as a Major Non-NATO Ally, for example.

The deteriorating international security climate since 2014 is testament to the failure of the present policies towards a **revisionist** Russia. There is evidently a need to identify and implement new models that can ensure peace and contain the Kremlin. The most pragmatic approach to this challenge lies in greater support for Ukrainian sovereignty and territorial integrity via the modification of the failing Minsk Process. Further delays will only lead to additional costs.

**Yes Revisionism---Ukraine---1AR**

**Ukraine uniquely proves --- Russia bases their rhetoric in historical revisionism to justify invasion.**

**Serhan, 22** (Yasmeen Serhan is a staff writer at The Atlantic, 2-27-22, Who Is Vladimir Putin’s Revisionist History For?, The Atlantic, <https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2022/02/putin-russia-ukraine-revisionist-history/622936/> /alundy)

Putin is not the only world leader who has harkened back to an ahistorical past to justify his decisions in the present. Right-wing nationalists [around the world](https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2022/02/11/history-patriotism-right-wing-politics/) have sought to portray themselves as the primary defenders of a glorious past that their enemies would seek to deny or forget. By [whitewashing uncomfortable legacies](https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2019/08/30/the-kremlin-is-trying-to-whitewash-russias-stalinist-past-a67096) and seeking to cultivate a politics of [historic grievance](https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/putin-rues-soviet-collapse-demise-historical-russia-2021-12-12/), Putin has attempted the same. But in his justification for the invasion of Ukraine, Putin’s ahistoricism has bordered on **delusion**. Whether the Russian people or the rest of the world share in it, for now, appears to be immaterial: If there’s one audience this revisionist history is designed for, it’s Putin himself.

The evolution of **Putin’s** historical **revisionism** can be seen throughout his public statements over the years. In 2005, he famously [described](https://www.nbcnews.com/id/wbna7632057) the collapse of the Soviet Union as the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the 20th century. Two years later, Putin [bemoaned](http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/24034) the aftermath of the Soviet era and the pernicious, unipolar world—one led not by Moscow, but by Washington—that it had created. Last year, in perhaps the clearest articulation of his worldview, Putin said that Ukrainians and Russians are “[one people—a single whole](http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/67843).” On Monday, he took that sentiment even further, declaring Ukraine to be “an **inalienable** part of our own history, culture, and spiritual space” whose independence was a product not of self-determination (Ukrainians resoundingly voted in favor of independence from the Soviet Union in a [1991 referendum](https://www.wilsoncenter.org/event/25-years-independence-the-ukrainian-referendum)), but rather “a **mistake**.”

Unlike his [2014 address](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=l10BsQzOGKM) announcing Moscow’s annexation of Crimea, which was largely framed as a moment of celebration, this was an angry speech—one ostensibly designed to make Russia’s people angry too, and to justify what was to come. “In territories adjacent to Russia, which I have to note is our historical land, a hostile ‘anti-Russia’ is taking shape,” Putin said in another address ahead of the invasion. “For our country, it is a matter of life and death, a matter of our historical future as a nation.”

It’s hard to know what Putin means by historical future (which is, on its face, an oxymoron), though we can take an educated guess. When Putin speaks of Russia today, he speaks of a country whose greatness is defined by its past—namely, its **imperial history** and its victory during World War II—which he believes must guide its present. “Putin weaponized history by giving it a function,” Orysia Lutsevych, the head of the Ukraine Forum at the London-based Chatham House think tank, told me. As far as the Russian president is concerned, “history is the fortune teller of the future.”

Such historical narratives can be compelling, especially when they elicit the kind of **nostalgic nationalism** that has proved potent elsewhere, including in the United States (where Donald Trump’s Republican Party has dubbed itself the defender of [“patriotic education”](https://www.nytimes.com/2020/09/17/us/politics/trump-patriotic-education.html)), India (where Hindu nationalists have appealed to pride in India’s past to undermine its secular present), and Hungary (where Prime Minister Viktor Orbán often [invokes](https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2020/06/03/how-viktor-orban-turned-century-hungarian-history-into-secret-weapon/) the territories the country lost after the First World War). “Putin is not the only person who is old enough to have felt that sense of deep, personalized humiliation and shame that came with the loss of power of the Soviet Union at the end of the Cold War,” Keir Giles, the author of [​​Moscow Rules: What Drives Russia to Confront the West](https://bookshop.org/a/12476/9780815735748), told me. “Anything that reasserts Russia as that great power with a greater status than others and the right to a global presence and global influence in others’ affairs will be popular in those sectors of the Russian population.”

Still, it’s difficult to gauge just how big that sector is or how pervasive the narrative has been among those who don’t share Putin’s semi-mythological view of history. A recent [CNN poll](https://edition.cnn.com/interactive/2022/02/europe/russia-ukraine-crisis-poll-intl/), published the day before the start of Moscow’s military invasion of Ukraine, found that though roughly half of Russians support using military force to prevent Ukraine from joining NATO, only 36 percent support doing so as a means of forcing a reunification of the two countries. The lack of support for the latter was most clearly evidenced by [anti-war protests](https://www.theatlantic.com/photo/2022/02/photos-anti-war-protests-russia/622914/) that have broken out across Russian cities.

When I spoke with Denis Volkov, the director of the Moscow-based Levada Center, Russia’s last independent pollster, in early February, he told me that though the majority of Russians fear war, few would feel comfortable voicing opposition to it if it came due to fear of reprisals. Indeed, more than [1,700 arrests](https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/feb/24/we-dont-want-this-russians-react-to-the-ukraine-invasion?CMP=Share_iOSApp_Othe) have already been made. Besides, Volkov said, “public opinion will be no limit to the Russian government.”

Though Putin may feel obliged to justify his war of choice to the Russian people, who with Ukrainians will share the costs of a bloody and drawn-out conflict, his revisionist history is designed to appeal to no one more so than himself. By restoring Russia’s control over its former territories, Putin not only corrects what he sees as a historic wrong but also cements his place in Russian history as the leader who restored the country to its rightful status.

The irony is that in his quest to make Russia great again, he risks achieving just the opposite. Invading Ukraine has already resulted in [wide-ranging sanctions](https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/feb/24/sanctions-against-russia-at-a-glance-people-organisations-uk-us-eu) and has all but ensured Russia’s diplomatic isolation. Even Putin’s friends in Europe, such as [Orbán](https://twitter.com/zoltanspox/status/1497099482965721103?s=20&t=imIB8HpI9TF87fiiLNyf0g) and Czech President [Milos Zeman](https://www.reuters.com/business/czech-president-russia-should-be-cut-off-swift-2022-02-24/), have gone out of their way to reiterate their support for Ukraine and their commitment to a joint European Union stance.

“Putin’s views have become more and more extreme over time to the point where they are now more or less unrecognizable and have few points of contact with history as it’s understood in the outside world,” Giles said. “He’s operating in a different plane of reality and in a different century.”

**Ukraine proves --- revisionism motivates invasion**

**Baibhawi, 22** (Riya Baibhawi, Senior news write at Republic World, 5/10/22, "US accuses Vladimir Putin of presenting 'revisionist history' in Victory Day speech," Republic World, <https://www.republicworld.com/world-news/russia-ukraine-crisis/us-accuses-vladimir-putin-of-presenting-revisionist-history-in-victory-day-speech-articleshow.html> /alundy

White House has accused Russian President Vladimir Putin of presenting a version of revisionist history in his Victory Day speech. As Putin used the occasion of Soviet victory to defend his Special Military Operation on Ukraine, US Press Secretary Jen Psaki said that his words distorted facts. On Monday, the Russian Czar addressed his countrymen from Red Square in Moscow but refrained from announcing victory over Ukraine.

Following the same, Psaki said, “But what I will say is that what we saw President Putin do is give a version of revisionist history that took the form of disinformation that we have seen too commonly as the Russian playbook.”

“You know, our view is that we should remember — and this is why I did this at the top — what this day is actually about, which is something that we have all celebrated, which is the defeat of Nazis in — after World War Two, something that Russians have celebrated in the streets for many years," she added.

'Patently False'

In his speech, Putin blamed the West for triggering the ongoing conflict in Ukraine and said that NATO threatened the security of the Russian Federation. "Russia called on the West for an honest dialogue, to search for reasonable, compromise solutions, to take into account each other's interests. All in vain. The NATO countries did not want to hear us, which means that they had completely different plans. The danger grew every day. Russia gave a pre-emptive rebuff to aggression. It was a forced, timely, and the only right decision. The decision of a sovereign, strong, independent country," Putin said. However, Psaki said that his claim was “absurd” and “patently false.”

On the other hand, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelsnkyy vowed to defeat Russia on Monday. He said, "Very soon there will be two Victory Days in Ukraine and someone will not have any." Marching on Khreschatyk Street in the country's capital Kyiv, he spoke about two victory days referring to triumph in world war II as well as Ukraine's victory in the ongoing war. The embattled leader said that his countrymen will win the war because they are fighting for their children. “We won then. We will win now. And Khreshchatyk will see the victory parade – the Victory of Ukraine!” he claimed.

**Yes Revisionism---Revanchist---1AR**

**Russian tendencies are revisionist and revanchist --- it threatens the entire LIO**

**Balachandran, 22** (Gopalan Balachandran, Co-director, Albert Hirshman Centre on Democracy, Professor of international history and politics, 3-7-22, ‘Revisionism, Revanchism, and the War in Ukraine’, Geneva Gradute Institute, <https://www.graduateinstitute.ch/communications/news/revisionism-revanchism-and-war-ukraine> / alundy)

This is a somber moment for all of us. The Albert Hirschman Centre on Democracy, like everyone else in this room, is committed to a just, democratic, inclusive, and rules-based international order. This order is now beset by fresh and dangerous uncertainties. In co-hosting [this event](https://www.graduateinstitute.ch/communications/news/town-hall-war-ukraine) we would like to underscore the importance of this commitment as we try to grapple with the dangerous uncertainties caused by Russia’s unjustified and brutal invasion of Ukraine.

Russia has been a revisionist power since the 1990s. Its invasion of Ukraine could be a signal that it is now embarked on a dangerously revanchist project. Time alone will tell how this revanchist tendency might unfold. A revanchist war in Ukraine risks being prolonged, it can also spread and escalate to threaten the entire world. I must underline this obvious point because the European dimension of the crisis has attracted attention. But in the last 250 years, Europe has been remarkably unsuccessful in containing conflicts in Europe to wars within Europe. So the whole world has a right to be concerned.

A ‘just, democratic, inclusive, and rules-based international order’ is not just a mouthful. It can be an oxymoron. A just, democratic, and inclusive international order has to be rules-based. It cannot be otherwise. But there is no reason, a priori, why a rules-based order should necessarily be just, democratic, or inclusive. The international order at any point in time is a constitutional settlement reflecting power relations at its moment of origin. It changes slowly, if at all, and often conditionally or contingently, as power equations change.

Revisionist projects, and resistance to them, are therefore the stuff of international relations, and intrinsic to the international order and its dynamics. Most such projects play by the rules. Brazil, Germany, India, and South Africa have been campaigning unsuccessfully for years to expand the permanent membership of the UN Security Council. They can lead to institutional innovations: after failing to reform the governance of multilateral financial institutions, China decided to set up the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank which is now backed by nearly 100 countries, among them five members of G7. The Bandung conference of 1955 was feared in the West as a move to set up a parallel, non-Western United Nations. But despite problems with the UN system, this remains unthinkable so long as we have hopes of reforming it.

**Competition**

**Perm---AT: Cease---1AR**

**“Cease” means to stop for a short time or slow down.**

**Benjamin ’01** [Susan; March of 2001; Benjamin, expert on plain language "Attorneys: Cause or Cure?" Plain Language, <https://www.michbar.org/file/generalinfo/plainenglish/pdfs/01_mar.pdf> //smarx, AZG]

This ownership can develop into an expertise envied by many, requested by all; or it can become a sort of linguistic rigor mortis. Case in point: in my plain-language training sessions, the term cease and desist invariably crops up in **discussions about wordiness**. Why not use cease or desist? Or how about stop? Because, comes the response, **cease means stop for a short time**, and desist means stop for good. Or cease **means slow down** and desist means stop. Or this **prizewinner:** cease means stop and desist means leave the room. This subjectivity, by the way, is not usually rooted in stubbornness or arrogance so much as in a belief that goes something like this: language is; therefore, it must be.